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Note
No More Secrets: Proposed Minnesota State Due
Process Requirement that Law Enforcement
Officers Electronically Record Custodial
Interrogation and Confessions
Ingrid Kane
An elderly woman, left in the cold after being beaten and
robbed of her purse, died from a combination of injuries and
exposure.' Police suspected that John Francis Biron, eighteen
years old, and his two juvenile companions committed the
crime. The three boys were arrested. Although Biron admit-
ted to taking sixty-four cents in an earlier, unreported rob-
bery,2 he steadfastly denied any participation in, or knowledge
of, the woman's death. Why, then, after continually proclaim-
ing his innocence during approximately six hours of police in-
terrogation, did Biron finally confess to the crime?
This question is answerable, and Biron's case is unique, be-
cause the police officers who interrogated him tape recorded
the sessions.3 The officers created the tapes for their own pur-
poses; 4 they did not intend to offer the tapes into evidence and
not all of the interrogators were even aware of the recorder's
presence.5 Those tapes, however, created a public record of a
criminal proceeding that would otherwise have remained
secret.
The recordings reveal that no police officer harmed or
1. State v. Biron, 123 N.W.2d 392 (Minn. 1963).
2. Id. at 394.
3. Officers commonly record confessions. In Biron, however, they also
recorded the interrogation itself, beginning with the first interrogator's initial
remarks. Tape of Police Interrogation of John Francis Biron (March 16, 1962)
(on file with University of Minnesota Law Library).
4. The officers expected Biron to "crack" quickly and they thought that
playing his taped confession to his accomplices would induce them to confess
quickly as well. As it turned out, Biron "held out" longer than expected.
YALE KAMISAR, Fred E. Inbau: "The Importance of Being Guilty", in POLICE
INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS 95, 98 n.2 (1980).
5. Id.
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threatened to harm Biron in any way. Instead, officers relent-
lessly advised, urged, nagged, and pleaded with Biron to con-
fess. The officers invoked everything from common sense to
criminal procedure to religion.6 Some of the officers' conduct-
such as suggesting that Biron's case might be handled by the ju-
venile court even though he was eighteen years old-was im-
proper, and ultimately resulted in a finding that the confession
was involuntary, and therefore inadmissible.7 Yet most of the
6. The following is a representative sampling from the tapes:
We can take you right into a courtroom then we can throw the key
away because you're not smart enough to try and help yourself...
You're the boy that's going to be stuck with the story. This is your
opportunity to help yourself.... The hole is getting bigger and you're
digging it deeper. You're the fellow who's gonna determine how long
you're gonna be buried. You and you alone. You're the only guy
that's got the shovel.... I don't think that you fellows intentionally
hurt that woman. I think that she had struggled for that purse. She
struggled for it because she couldn't stand anything taken from her.
That woman would save every little thing she got .... We know you
didn't intentionally kill that lady.... You'll find it'll be a lot easier if
you just get it off your chest. That's why I asked you if you wanted to
see a priest. Let him advise you.... I'm Catholic too. I can appreci-
ate that.... I think you realize you'll feel a lot better if you did do it
and you tell about it .... It takes a lot of guts, I'll admit. I mean, you
have to be a real man .... I think you'll find that I would respect you
a lot more, and anybody else would, when you're man enough to tell
the truth. A mistake was made. I mean, it's a bad deal.... You
aren't dumb. You know what the score is.... I've got 20 years in this
business and I've talked to many, many people who have committed a
lot worse crimes than you have... ever thought of committing. And
there isn't anything you can tell me that would shock me.... I do
know this: A man is a lot better off if he tells the truth. No matter
how terrible the thing is that might have been done. No matter how
terrible it is. Even if you're real ashamed of it deep down inside of
you-you just almost crawl when you think of it.... It ain't our job
to try and put guys away. Our job is trying to straighten you out....
We're your only friends right now. We can't tell you that we can take
you off the hook all together. All we can do is advise you to the
proper thing that you gotta do.... You ain't the only guy who has
ever made a mistake.... But don't think we haven't made a mistake
too .... This ain't John the Baptist you're looking at here. I'm no
angel .... People have to have the police to protect them. And right
now, you need the protection of us. We're trying to advise you as to
the proper thing to do.... It's a heck of a thing, but your intentions
were to get a couple of bucks and nothing more. But we can't put
words in your mouth. You've got to tell us what happened.
Tape of Police Interrogation of John Francis Biron, supra note 3.
7. State v. Biron, 123 N.W.2d 392, 399 (Minn. 1963). The officers told
Biron:
[A juvenile court judge] will look over the whole thing, and he will
say "Well, here this boy is 18 but he's just not very much older than
the other two. I will handle all three of them." You get the drift?
But, this we can't do if you don't tell us.... So you are the 18-year-
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techniques the officers used, such as keeping the suspect on the
defensive, displaying confidence in the suspect's guilt, mnirniz-
ing the moral seriousness of the offense, blaming the victim,
and sympathizing with the suspect, are recommended in lead-
ing police manuals.8 The tapes, therefore, vividly demonstrate
approved interrogation tactics of psychological manipulation.
Any meaningful discussion of police interrogation requires
an understanding of the true nature of such questioning.9 Un-
fortunately, the secrecy with which the police shroud their in-
terrogation procedures prevents judges, lawyers, and citizens
from knowing with any certainty what actually occurs during
custodial interrogation.' 0 Limited information comes from po-
lice manuals, legal writers, and court opinions. These sources
demonstrate that well-trained police interrogators manipulate
every detail of a station house questioning and that each aspect
of the interrogation is part of a carefully crafted plan calculated
to induce the suspect to confess. Moreover, the accused person
subjected to police interrogation usually feels confused, fright-
ened, and vulnerable-in other words, highly susceptible to
psychological manipulation. Police interrogation in the United
States criminal justice system has shifted from a crude system
in which law enforcement officers sometimes extracted confes-
sions by means including physical deprivation and torture" to a
practice dominated by subtle, but highly effective, techniques of
psychological coercion.12 An enormous power differential sepa-
old. If you don't cooperate and tell us everything we won't even con-
sider you going down and talking to the juvenile judge.
Id. at 396.
The court never suggested that the officers' incessant questioning may
have been inherently coercive or that it may have violated Biron's constitu-
tional rights to a lawyer and to remain silent.
8. See generally FRED INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CON-
FESSIONS 77-194 (1986) (discussing the nine steps to effective interrogation).
9. Discussing police interrogation without understanding the techniques
commonly used "is playing Hamlet without the ghost." Bernard Weisberg, Po-
lice Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, in POLICE POWER
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 153, 155 (Claude R. Sowle ed., 1962).
10. "Custodial interrogation" refers to explicit questioning by law enforce-
ment officers of a suspect whom they hold in custody at a police station or
other government office. Although most of the analysis applies with equal
force to other forms of police questioning that occur outside police headquar-
ters, this Note limits its scope to the clearest case of custodial interrogation.
11. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), in which a sheriff
and an angry mob of white men extracted confessions from black suspects af-
ter prolonged torture.
12. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 294-95 (1980) (quoting one
police officer saying to another within earshot of the suspect: "God forbid one
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rates the suspect and the police officers. The police systemati-
cally exploit that power differential during interrogation.
Under present law, to admit an incriminating statement
made by a defendant while in police custody, the court must de-
termine that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelli-
gently waived her rights to a lawyer and to remain silent, and
that police did not use impermissibly coercive means to obtain
the statement. Usually the court has no independent record
upon which to base that determination. Psychological manipu-
lation, unlike physical coercion, leaves few visible marks. The
court is assisted only by the biased testimony of interested par-
ties. To make a fair determination of whether the products of
the interrogation process are admissible, the court needs a com-
plete, accurate, and objective record of that process.
This Note argues that the Minnesota Constitution's due
process clause requires law enforcement officers to record elec-
tronically custodial interrogations. Any unexcused failure to
record, as well as any unexcused interruption of the recording,
renders a defendant's statements inadmissible. Part I surveys
the interrogation practices law enforcement officers commonly
employ, and highlights the incongruity between our generally
open accusatory criminal procedure and the secrecy that sur-
rounds custodial interrogation. Part II reviews federal interro-
gation and confession jurisprudence. Minnesota confession
jurisprudence relies heavily on federal law, and the inadequate
and confused state of federal law in this area creates a compel-
ling need for state innovations. Part III of this Note looks at
Minnesota state constitutional interpretation, focusing on the
factors the Minnesota Supreme Court considers when indepen-
dently interpreting the state constitution. Finally, Part IV
demonstrates that the due process clause of the Minnesota Con-
stitution should be read to require law enforcement officers to
record custodial interrogations.
I. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS
Police interrogation of a criminal suspect stands in stark
contrast to the general openness of the American criminal jus-
of [the disabled children] might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt
themselves."); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 392 (1977) (describing police
officer who, while attempting to locate the victim's missing body and knowing
that the defendant was a former mental patient and also deeply religious, gave
the "Christian burial speech," expressing the view that the parents of the
missing child were entitled to give their little girl a proper Christian burial).
[Vol. 77:983
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tice system.13 At the courthouse, the defendant's innocence is
presumed; in the station house, skilled police interrogators dis-
play absolute confidence in the suspect's guilt.14 During trial,
the state presents its case against the accused before a judge
and, usually, jury; during police questioning, the suspect faces
her interrogator in private, usually over long periods of time,
without the benefit of an impartial mediator. 15  In court, the
defendant's lawyer guides her direct testimony and protects her
from improper cross-examination by the state; in the interroga-
tion room, the arrestee alone confronts interrogators trained to
extract confessions using psychological tactics of trickery and
deceit.16 Finally, during trial, a court reporter takes down
13. See YALE KAmismA , Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of
American Criminal Procedure, in POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS,
supra note 4, at 27, 28-30 (juxtaposing the open proceedings in American
courtrooms with the secret, closed proceedings in police interrogation rooms).
14. Once the interrogator develops a belief that a suspect is guilty, she
should proceed to extract a confession according to a nine-step plan. INBAU ET
AL., supra note 8, at 77-79. In the first, crucial step, the interrogator enters the
interrogation room (after a calculated delay during which the suspect is kept
anxiously waiting) and directly confronts the suspect with a statement like,
"Joe, the results of our investigation clearly indicate that you broke into Ja-
son's Jewelry Store last week." See id. at 87. Advocates for the practice jus-
tify inquisitorial confrontations-despite the potential harm to innocent
persons-by claiming that but for interrogation and the opportunity to clear
one's name, an innocent person might forever remain under a cloud of suspi-
cion. Id. at 91.
15. The Supreme Court has observed that privacy is the principal psycho-
logical factor contributing to a successful interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 449 (1966). Today, police interrogators still go to extreme lengths
to create the "right" atmosphere of privacy:
The room should be quiet, with none of the usual "police" surround-
ings and with no distractions within the suspect's view... The room
should be as free as possible from outside noises and should also be a
room into which no one will have occasion to enter or pass through
during the interrogation. This will not only instill a sense of privacy,
but also the less the surroundings suggest a police detention facility,
the less difficult it will be for the suspect or arrestee who is really
guilty to implicate himself.... Interrogation rooms should be plain of
color, should have smooth walls, and should not contain ornaments,
pictures, or other objects that would in any way distract the attention
of the person being interviewed. Even small, loose objects, such as pa-
per clips or pencils, should be out of the subject's reach so that he
cannot pick up and fumble with anything during the course of the in-
terrogation. Tension-relieving activities of this sort can [help] a guilty
person.., to suppress an urge to confess.
INBAU ET AL., supra note 8, at 29.
16. Trained police interrogators
are opposed ... to the use of force, threats of force, or promises of
leniency--any one of which might well induce an innocent person to
confess. We do approve, however, of such psychological tactics and
techniques as trickery and deceit that are not only helpful but fre-
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every spoken word to create an accurate and public record; dur-
ing interrogation, law enforcement officers rarely make an ob-
jective record.
Proponents of police interrogation make a strong case for
its necessity. Many criminal cases, even with proper investiga-
tion by law enforcement officers, lack witnesses, physical clues,
or other evidence sufficient to establish guilt.17 Without in-
criminating statements from involved parties, those crimes
would go unpunished. Further, the argument goes, most crimi-
nal offenders will not admit their guilt unless prodded to do
so.' Therefore interrogation, by whatever means necessary to
extract an honest admission of guilt, serves a valuable societal
function. 19 Only one stipulation modifies this general rule:
"[N]othing shall be done or said to the suspect that will be apt
to make an innocent person confess. '20
The need to elicit incriminating evidence from suspected
criminals in privacy may be satisfied while denying law en-
forcement officers the authority to shroud interrogation pro-
ceedings with a veil of secrecy. The courts must distinguish
between "privacy" and "secrecy" because the two concepts
carry strikingly different implications in the context of police
interrogations. 2' Police officers do testify in court about what
quently indispensable in order to secure incriminating information
from the guilty, or to obtain investigative leads from otherwise unco-
operative witnesses or informants.
INBAU ET AL., supra note 8, at xiv (emphasis added).
After the interrogator clearly posits the suspect's guilt, the next step in
extracting a confession is to "establish the psychological foundation to achieve
an implicit, if not explicit, early, general admission of guilt." Id. at 97. To cre-
ate this foundation, the interrogator sympathizes with the suspect and suggests
justifications or excuses for the act the interrogator believes the suspect com-
mitted. The interrogator explains that anyone under similar circumstances
would do the same thing, minimizes the moral seriousness of the offense, and
"offers an added incentive to obtain the greater degree of relief and comfort
that would be provided by a confession." Id.
17. Id. at xiv.
18. Id. at xvi.
19. Id at xvi-xvi.
20. Id. at xvii.
21. Secrecy refers to the state of being kept from the knowledge of others.
See NEW WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
902 (1992). Privacy refers to the state of being hidden from, or undisturbed
by, the observation or activities of other persons. 1d. at 796. Thus, although an
interrogator may question a suspect in privacy (i.e., alone in a quiet room),
what transpires during the interview need not be secret (i.e., unknown to the
court). "It is secrecy, not privacy, which accounts for the absence of a reliable
record of interrogation proceedings in a police station. If the need for some
pre-judicial questioning is assumed, privacy may be defended on grounds of ne-
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occurred during an interrogation; but by refusing to record in-
terrogations, police appear to champion a system in which only
police themselves can effectively monitor interrogation.
II. FEDERAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSION
DECISIONS
Court determinations of the admissibility of criminal con-
fessions implicate several distinct but complementary constitu-
tional principles.22 At the core of the inquiry lies the due
process 23 prohibition against coerced confessions.24 Due process
is concerned with the methods police employ to extract incrimi-
nating statements. "Coerced" statements are inadmissible,25
whereas a "knowing" and "voluntary" confession may be used
against a defendant in court.26 In addition to general due pro-
cess concerns, courts have focused on the privilege against self-
incrimination and the right to counsel guaranteed by the
Fifth27 and Sixth Amendments respectively.28
cessity; secrecy cannot be defended on this or any other ground." Weisberg,
supra note 9, at 180.
22. Cases sometimes conflate the distinct legal doctrines that govern con-
fessions. For example, courts often run together the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination and the common law doctrine of
voluntariness-a rule of evidence governing the admissibility of a confession at
trial. See Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's
Voluntariness Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 92-101
(1989). Cases also reflect confusion between the common law voluntariness
doctrine and the due process voluntariness test, developed by the Supreme
Court to govern admissibility of confessions in state cases prior to the Court's
incorporation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination into
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id at 93 n.147.
23. U.S. CoNST. amend. V ("No Person... shall be compelled in any crim-
inal case to be a witness against himself .... ."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1,
("No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .... ).
24. The Supreme Court "use[s] the terms 'coerced confession' and 'invol-
untary confession' interchangeably 'by way of convenient shorthand."' Ari-
zona v. Fulimante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1253 n.3 (1991) (quoting Blackburn v.
Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960)).
25. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (holding that admission
of written confession violated due process where police held suspect incommu-
nicado for 16 hours and told suspect he could not call his wife or lawyer until
he "cooperated" by signing the statement).
26. See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 621 (1961).
27. In 1964, the Supreme Court held the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
28. In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the Court held that a sus-
pect, on whom a police investigation was "focused," and whom police took into
custody, interrogated, denied requests to see his counsel and failed to inform
1993]
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A. FEDERAL DUE PROCESS "VOLUNTARINESS" STANDARD
Prior to Miranda v. Arizona,29 only the doctrine of volun-
tariness governed the admissibility of confessions in state
courts.30 Fourteenth Amendment due process principles re-
quire the exclusion at trial of involuntary confessions extracted
by coercive police tactics.31 Courts judge "voluntariness" under
the totality of circumstances on a case-by-case basis,32 making
clear guidelines difficult to identify.33 Some general themes,
however, have developed over time.3 The Supreme Court
strongly disfavors police practices involving physical abuse;
physical torture constitutes per se coercion.35 In addition, the
Court considers personal characteristics such as the age, intelli-
gence,36 and mental condition37 of the accused, as well as the
of his right to remain silent, had been denied the "Assistance of Counsel" in
violation of the Sixth Amendment. Id at 491. The Court prohibited the state
from using the statements police obtained. IHi The Court later rejected this
"focus" test in Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48 (1976) (holding
that the police need not inform a suspect of her rights until her freedom of
action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest).
29. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
30. See e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936). In 1908, the
Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation did not apply to the states. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 94-95
(1908), overruled by Malloy, 378 U.S. 1. Thus, when the Court considered its
first state confession case it looked to the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Brown, 297 U.S. at 286. For detailed discussions of the
due process voluntariness test, see YALE KAMISAR, What is an "Involuntary"
Confession?, in POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 4, at 1-
25; Benner, supra note 22, at 92-117, 122-54; Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness,
Free Will and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REv. 859, 891-919 (1979); Ste-
phen Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MIcH. L. REV. 865, 867-87
(1981).
31. The use of an involuntary confession for any purpose, including im-
peachment, constitutes a due process violation. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 401 (1978).
32. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957).
33. KAmisAR, supra note 30, at 1-25.
34. For a comprehensive review of Supreme Court decisions under the
voluntariness doctrine, see OTIS H. STEVENS, THE SUPREmE COURT AND CON-
FESSIONS OF GUILT 90-119 (1973).
35. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), in which a group of
white men, including the deputy sheriff, hanged and repeatedly whipped a
black man until he made a false confession.
Subsequent cases provided the Court with the opportunity to define due
process requirements in less violent situations. See, e.g., Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227, 239 (1940), in which four suspects were held uncharged and re-
peatedly questioned for five days under circumstances designed "to fill peti-
tioners with terror and frightful misgivings."
36. The Court more often found police coercion in cases involving youth-
ful and uneducated suspects. See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,
[Vol. 77:983
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interrogation conditions.38 The Court views no single fact,
short of physical torture, as determinative of a finding of
involuntariness. 39
The early "voluntariness" standard suffered several crucial
defects. First, because the Court had difficulty defining volun-
tariness with piecision,40 the standard failed to offer clear gui-
dance to either law enforcement officers or lower courts.41
Second, the test allowed law enforcement officers to exert con-
siderable pressure during interrogation.42 Third, application of
the voluntariness test turned on a swearing contest between
the defendant and her interrogators. Notably, even if the
Court had specified more fully the components of an involun-
tary confession, application of the test would still have de-
pended on a factual examination of events that took place in
secret, without a full, objective record.
Recently, the Supreme Court articulated a "new voluntari-
ness" standard to govern the admissibility of confessions.43
This new standard narrows the focus of the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" inquiry to actual police coercion, and it ignores the
620 (1961) ("thirty-three-year-old mental defective of the moron class"). Con-
versely, the Court tended to uphold confessions made by more educated and
experienced persons. See, e.g., Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) (sus-
pect had completed one year of law school); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156,
185 (1953) ("not young, soft, ignorant or timid").
37. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960) (suspect had
been discharged from the armed forces as "permanently disabled by psychosis"
and had been institutionalized up until time of the crime).
38. See, e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (police gave accused
no food for over 24 hours); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (defend-
ant not permitted to sleep for 36 hours).
39. "It is impossible for this Court, in enforcing the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, to attempt precisely to delimit, or to surround with specific, all-inclusive
restrictions, the power of interrogation allowed to state law enforcement of-
ficers in obtaining confessions." Culombe, 367 U.S. at 601 (plurality) (Frank-
furter, J.).
40. Justice Frankfurter made one of the more concerted efforts to define
"voluntariness" in the confessions context. He wrote: "The line of distinction
[between a voluntary and an involuntary confession] is that at which gov-
erning self-direction is lost and compulsion, of whatever nature or however
infused, propels or helps to propel the confession." Id. at 602 (emphasis
added).
41. STEPHAN A. SALTZBuRG, AmERicAN CRPiMNAL PROCEDURE 450-51
(1988); Schulhofer, supra note 30, at 869. Further, the fact that the Supreme
Court reviewed only a few state confession cases, usually limiting certiorari to
death penalty and other special cases, compounded the confusion. SALTZBURG,
supra, at 451
42. See KAMISAR, supra note 13, at 31-40.
43. See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986); Moran v. Burbine,
475 U.S. 412 (1986); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
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Miranda Court's attempt to impose greater restraints on police
conduct." In Colorado v. Connelly,4 the Court held that a con-
fession could not be involuntary absent police coercion.4 6 The
Court overruled the lower court's decision to exclude incrimi-
nating statements made to police officers by a man suffering
from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and experiencing "com-
mand hallucinations."4 7 The Court reasoned that because the
police did not physically coerce Connelly into confessing, the
government's taking down the confession, and admitting it into
evidence, did not violate due process.48
B. THE FEDERAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL
By 1959, the Court showed signs of growing dissatisfaction
with the voluntariness standard. In Spano v. New York,49 a
majority of the Court held the defendant's confession inadmis-
sible under the traditional Fourteenth Amendment due process
analysis. 0 Notably, however, four concurring Justices, in two
separate opinions, stated that the Constitution required rever-
44. Daniel W. Sasali, Guarding the Guardians: Police Trickery and Con-
fessions, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1593, 1605 (1988).
45. 479 U.S. 157 (1986). Connelly approached a police officer in Denver
and confessed to the murder of a young girl. The officer immediately advised
Connelly of his rights. Connelly said he understood them but wanted to talk
about the crime. The officer took Connelly to police headquarters. There,
Connelly told police that he had been a patient in several mental hospitals. Id
at 160. Connelly took officers to the scene and described the murder in detail.
Id. at 160-61. Although officers claimed that Connelly showed no sign of
mental illness, the next day at the public defender's office he became visibly
disoriented and confused. Id. at 161. Connelly stated that "voices" had in-
structed him to fly to Denver and to confess to the murder. Id. When the
court eventually found Connelly competent to assist in his own defense, a psy-
chiatrist testified at the preliminary hearing as an expert witness. Id The
doctor stated that Connelly's psychotic condition interfered with his ability to
make free and rational choices. Id. The doctor testified that the condition did
not substantially impair Connelly's cognitive abilities. Id.
46. Id. at 167.
47. Id. at 161. The lower court had held that admission of the confession
violated due process because the defendant's mental condition interfered with
his "rational intellect" and "free will." Id at 159.
48. Id at 167. See Benner, supra note 22, at 66 ("[Voluntariness simply
entails the absence of official coercion, and does not otherwise require ethical
conduct or fairness in dealing with the accused.").
49. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
50. Id. at 323-24. In Spano, the defendant, a 25-year-old man, born in It-
aly, with a junior high school education level, confessed after an overnight,
eight-hour long interrogation. Id. at 316-20. Police used an officer, a friend of
the suspect from the same neighborhood, to misrepresent facts and encourage
a confession. Id at 318-19.
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sal because authorities deliberately extracted the confession
while depriving the defendant of his right to a lawyer's
assistance.51
In 1964, the Court decided two major cases affirming a de-
fendant's right to counsel during interrogation. First, in Mas-
siah v. United States,52 the Court held that the government
violated the defendant's right to counsel by admitting incrimi-
nating, post-indictment statements that federal agents deliber-
ately elicited in the absence of the defendant's lawyer.5 3 Later
that year, in Escobedo v. Illinois,M the Court held that prosecu-
tion use of a confession police obtained from an unindicted sus-
pect in custody violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.55 Although the Court carefully limited its
holding to the facts of the case,56 Escobedo is significant because
it reflects the Court's disfavor of the totality of the circum-
stances test under the due process voluntariness standard,57 and
it explicitly recognizes the link between a defendant's right to
counsel and her privilege against compelled self-
incrimination.58
51. Id. at 324-26 (Douglas, J., concurring). "Depriving a person, formally
charged with a crime, of counsel during the period prior to trial may be more
damaging than denial of counsel during the trial itself." Id at 325.
52. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). Massiah was indicted on federal drug charges. Id
at 202. He retained a lawyer, pleaded not guilty and was released on bail. Id.
A conspirator-turned-government-informer elicited incriminating statements
from the defendant and transmitted the information to government agents.
Id at 202-03. The court admitted evidence of the defendant's statements at
trial. Id at 203.
53. Id. at 206.
54. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
55. Id. at 490-91.
56. Id.
57. Escobedo supports this proposition by negative inference. See id at
491. Although the circumstances of Escobedo's interrogation probably were
sufficient to bar his statements under the voluntariness standard, the Court
did not apply that test.
Escobedo, a 22-year-old with no prior experience with the police, stood
handcuffed during most of the interrogation. Id at 481. He had not slept well
in over a week. Id One of his interrogators, who had grown up in Escobedo's
neighborhood, knew his family, and spoke to him in Spanish, made assurances
to him that he could go home as soon as he told what he knew about the
crime. Id at 482. The agent who took down the incriminating statements did
so by asking carefully framed questions apparently designed to ensure the ad-
missibility of the answers. Id at 483. Police continually denied his repeated
requests to speak to his lawyer. Id at 481. Finally, no one ever informed Es-
cobedo of his constitutional right to remain silent. Id at 482-83.
58. Id at 488. The majority explained that a system in which all persons
exercise their rights cannot be undesirable:
No system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is
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C. THE FEDERAL PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
In the seminal decision Miranda v. Arizona, 59 the Supreme
Court recognized that custodial interrogation by its nature co-
erces a suspect to speak.60 Accordingly, the court extended the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 6 ' into the
police station.62 The Miranda Court articulated the safeguards
necessary to protect a suspect's rights, 63 absent equally effective
legislative remedies.64 According to the Court, before a custo-
dial interrogation may occur law enforcement officers must
warn the suspect of her rights to remain silent and to consult a
lawyer.65 If the suspect indicates a desire to remain silent or to
consult with a lawyer, the questioning must cease.66 If the sus-
permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and ex-
ercise these rights. If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart
the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is some-
thing very wrong with that system.
Id. at 490.
In contrast, the dissenting Justices took the position that the government
may try to discourage persons from exercising their constitutional rights as
long as the choice ultimately rests with the individual. See id. at 495-99 (White,
J., dissenting).
59. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
60. Id. at 467. The Court identified two interrelated aspects that create a
coercive atmosphere and endanger suspects' Fifth Amendment rights. First,
suspects inevitably feel powerless when taken into police custody and thrown
into a hostile environment. Id. at 455-57, 461. The Court stressed that the "at-
mosphere [of custodial interrogation] carries its own badge of intimidation"
and surrounds suspects with "antagonistic forces." Id. at 457, 461. Second, po-
lice interrogators employ tactics that seize upon and exploit suspects' feelings
of helplessness. Id. at 448-55.
61. Id. at 468. In reaching its decision, the Court recognized the funda-
mental nature of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Id.
62. Id. at 461. Thus, the pivotal holding of Miranda is that:
all principles embodied in the privilege [against self-incrimination] ap-
ply to informal compulsion exerted by law enforcement officers dur-
ing in-custody questioning. An individual swept from familiar
surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces,
and subjected to [certain] techniques of persuasion . . . cannot be
otherwise than under compulsion to speak ....
Id.
63. Id. at 444. Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court held "the
prosecution may not use statements whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stem-
ming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the
use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-in-
crimination." Id.
64. Id. at 467. "We encourage Congress and the States to continue their
laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the
individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws." Id.
65. Id. at 467-68.
66. Id. at 473-74. The suspect may invoke the privilege "in any manner, at
any time prior to or during questioning." Id.
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pect elects to speak, the state bears a "heavy burden" to
demonstrate that the individual "knowingly and intelligently"
waived the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to
counsel.67 Absent demonstrated police compliance with the
procedures that Miranda established (or the use of equivalent
safeguards), statements obtained from a suspect in custody are
presumed coerced and are inadmissible as a matter of law.68
Miranda represented a compromise between the old volun-
tariness test and more extreme proposals that would have
"killed" confessions. 69 Subsequent Court decisions have gradu-
ally diminished Miranda's precedential importance. Signifi-
cantly, the Court has developed a minimal definition of what
67. Id. at 475 (re-asserting the standard for waiver of constitutional rights
established by Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)).
68. 1& at 467.
69. See, e.g., YALE KAMIsAR, Kauper's "Judicial Examination of the Ac-
cused" Forty Years Later-Some Comments on a Remarkable Article, in PO-
LICE INTERROGATION AND CONFEssIoNs, supra note 4, at 77, 87-89 (reviewing a
proposal to replace police interrogation with a judicially supervised system in
which a suspect, immediately after arrest, would appear before a judicial of-
ficer without the assistance of counsel).
Justice White, making a grim forecast of the effect Miranda would have
on law enforcement, proclaimed: "In some unknown number of cases, the
Court's rule will return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the streets and to
the environment which produced him, to repeat his crime whenever it pleases
him. As a consequence, there will be not a gain, but a loss, in human dignity."
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 542 (White, J., dissenting).
Proponents of defendants' rights argue that Miranda's prophylactic rule
provides insufficient protection against abuses of police power. See, e.g., JAMES
S. KUNEN, "How CAN You DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE?" 132 (1983):
Police love the Miranda decision. They speed-read the suspect his
rights and then tell him to fill in and sign a printed waiver form. He's
frightened; he doesn't understand what was read to him; he's afraid
he'll look guilty if he doesn't sign; he signs, and school's out. The
signed waiver is almost impossible for the defense to overcome.
Impact studies conclude that Miranda has not reduced confessions or
posed a barrier to effective law enforcement. See John Griffiths & Richard E.
Ayres, A Postscript to the Miranda Project" Interrogation of Draft Protesters,
77 YALE L.J. 300, 310-11 (1967); Lawrence S. Leiken, Police Interrogation in
Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47 DENV. L.J. 1, 16-26 (1970);
Michael Wald et al., Special Project, Interrogations in New Haven: The Im-
pact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1562-99 (1967); see also Stephen J.
Schulhofer, The Fifth Amendment at Justice: A Reply, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 950,
954-55 (1987); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. Cm. L.
REv. 435, 455-60 (1987); Welsh S. White, Defending Miranda. A Reply to Pro-
fessor Caplan, 39 VAND. L. REv. 1, 14 (1986).
For a defense of the claim that the Miranda decision hurts law enforce-
ment see Gerald M. Kaplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417,
1458-67 (1985) and Stephen J. Markman, The Fifth Amendment and Custodial
Questioning: A Response to Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 938,
(1987).
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constitutes an acceptable waiver.70 Further, the Court has held
that although the government may not use incriminating state-
ments elicited in the absence of proper Miranda warnings and
waivers as part of its case-in-chief against a defendant, it may
offer such statements into evidence to impeach the defendant's
credibility.71 Most importantly, the Burger Court stressed that
the warnings are not constitutional rights themselves, but only
measures designed to safeguard Fifth Amendment rights; ac-
cordingly, violations of the procedure do not automatically
render evidence derived from a suspect's statements inadmissi-
ble.72 The Rehnquist Court, continuing the trend, created a
"public safety" exception, obviating the need for Miranda
warnings when police question a suspect at the scene of a crime
in a situation that poses a threat to public safety.73 Recently,
the Court held that harmless error analysis applies to the im-
proper admission of involuntary confessions.74 Most signifi-
cantly, the Court's new standard for voluntariness erodes
Miranda's definition of compulsion by focusing exclusively on
police conduct.75
70. Warnings need not duplicate the exact language of Miranda. See Mi-
randa, 384 U.S. at 467; see California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981) (per
curiam) (no "talismanic incantation" is necessary to satisfy strictures of Mi-
randa). The Court, however, has upheld confusing, misleading and incomplete
warning language that provides little guarantee that a suspect hearing those
warnings will fully understand the rights she waives. See Duckworth v.
Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203-04 (1989) (holding that "We have no way of giving you
a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to
court" adequately advised defendant of Miranda rights).
71. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971); see also SALTZBURG, supra note 41, at 486 (explaining that Harris and
Hass create a double bind for defendants who want to testify in their own de-
fense at trial). In contrast, use of an "involuntary" confession, even for im-
peachment purposes, constitutes "a denial of due process of law." Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
72. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-46 (1974).
73. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-59 (1984).
74. Arizona v. Fulimante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). The Court first articu-
lated the harmless error rule in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 20-24
(1967). Chapman stated that the prohibition on involuntary confessions, as
well as the right to counsel and the right to an impartial judge, are "constitu-
tional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be harmless
error." Id. at 23 & n.8. In Fulimante, however, five Justices distinguished co-
erced confessions from the violations of the right to counsel and the right to
an impartial judge by calling the admission of an involuntary confession a
"classic 'trial error."' 111 S. Ct. at 1264. Admission of an involuntary confes-
sion can be "quantitatively assessed in the context of other-evidence presented
in order to determine whether its admission was harmless error beyond a rea-
sonable doubt." Id.
75. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).
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D. THE STATE'S DUTY TO PRESERVE EVIDENCE
In California v. Trombetta,7 6 the Supreme Court measured
the state's duty to preserve evidence using the "constitutional
materiality" test.77 The test has three parts: the evidence must
reasonably be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's
defense; the exculpatory value must be apparent before the evi-
dence is lost; and the defendant must not be able to obtain com-
parable evidence by other reasonable means.78
The failure to record a custodial interrogation should al-
ways fail the constitutional materiality test. Even if a court
finds that the exculpatory value of the record satisfies the first
prong of the test, a defendant always has an alternative means
of obtaining and presenting that evidence: her own testimony
about what occurred during the interrogation. The standard,
therefore, as applied to police interrogations, gives federal judi-
cial sanction to the "swearing contest" between the defendant
and police.
III. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
A. STATE COURT INNOVATIONS IN A FEDERALIST SYSTEM
A fundamental aspect of our federal system is that state
and federal courts share the responsibility of protecting individ-
uals' constitutional rights. The United States Supreme Court's
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment establish a mini-
mum level of protection from state action.79 Conversely, as a
matter of federal constitutional law, state courts cannot inter-
pret federal law more expansively than the Supreme Court.8 0
State courts may, however, properly use their own constitutions
as authority to provide their citizens with more expansive pro-
tection than afforded under federal law.8 ' Thus, a state may in-
76. 467 U.S. 479 (1984) (unanimous).
77. See id- at 486-90 (rejecting claim that state must preserve breath sam-
ples used in measuring a defendant's blood alcohol content).
78. 1&c at 488-89; cf United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (imposing a
similar requirement of materiality for prosecutorial disclosure).
79. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981);
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
80. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 461-62 n.6; Hass, 420 U.S. at 718.
81. The Supreme Court has long held that federal courts may not review
state court decisions based on an independent and adequate state ground. See,
e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Hass, 420 U.S.
at 719; Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); see also Shirley S. Abraham-
son, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitu-
tional Law, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1141, 1156-80 (1985); Terrence J. Fleming & Jack
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terpret its constitution to raise the threshold of protection for
individual rights.
The emergence of a "new federalism"8 2 has encouraged
state supreme courts to experiment in the administration of
criminal justice.8 3 State courts should, and often do, function
as significant constitutional law courts with judges interpreting
their state constitutions, in addition to the Federal Constitu-
tion, to define defendants' rights in the state criminal justice
system. State courts have developed a substantial body of state
constitutional law around criminal procedure issues,84 particu-
larly in the area of searches and seizures. Some state courts
have refused to limit state constitutional protection for subjects
of interrogation to that provided under the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of the Federal Constitution.8s Too many lawyers
and judges, however, overlook or underestimate the potential
of state constitutional law.86
Nordby, The Minnesota Bill of Rights: 'Wrapt in the Old Miasmal Mist," 7
HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 59-63 (1984); William W. Greenhalgh, Independent and
Adequate State Grounds: The Long and the Short of It, in RECENT DEVELOP-
MENTS IN STATE CONsTTUrIoNAL LAw 15, 15-63 (Phylis S. Bamberger ed.,
1985) (discussing state courts' reliance on state constitutions to maintain crimi-
nal procedural safeguards).
82. One state supreme court justice defines "new federalism" as "the will-
ingness of state courts to assert themselves as final arbiters in questions of
their citizens' individual rights by relying on their own law, especially their
own state constitutions." Abrahamson, supra note 81, at 1144 n.6.
83. Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932), explained the important function of state
experimentation:
There must be power in the States and the Nation to remould,
through experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to
meet changing social and economic needs.... It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and eco-
nomic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
Id. at 311.
84. See Greenhalgh, supra note 81, at 47-62 (appendix listing numerous
cases in which state courts construed their respective constitutions more ex-
pansively than the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments).
85. See, e.g., People v. Arthur, 239 N.E.2d 537, 538-39 (N.Y. 1968) (holding,
contrary to the federal rule established in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422
(1986), that once police have been informed that a suspect is represented by
counsel or that a lawyer has communicated with the police for the purpose of
representing the accused, the accused's right to counsel attaches).
86. See Fleming & Nordby, supra note 81, !passim; Abrahamson, supra
note 81, passim.
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B. MINNESOTA'S RESPONSE TO FEDERAL CONFESSION AND
INTERROGATION JURISPRUDENCE
The Minnesota Supreme Court's caselaw follows the
United States Supreme Court's confession and interrogation de-
cisions in virtual lock-step fashion. Minnesota courts employ
the "voluntariness" test to judge the admissibility of confes-
sions.8 7 The State may use a defendant's incriminating state-
ments against her at trial if she freely and voluntarily made the
statements, meaning without compulsion or improper govern-
ment inducement.8 8 In addition, for the statements to be ad-
missible, Minnesota courts require that the police issue
Miranda warnings to suspects and that a suspect voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently waive those rights.8 9 The Minne-
sota Supreme Court also has held that Minnesota's constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination is coextensive with
the federal constitutional privilege.90 Similarly, Minnesota ap-
plies the federal "public safety" exception to Miranda9 l and
recognizes the doctrine of "constitutional materiality" as ap-
plied to the preservation of evidence under the Federal
Constitution.92
To date, the Minnesota Supreme Court has offered ample
rhetoric, 93 but no actual holdings that rely on the Minnesota
87. See State v. Orscanin, 283 N.W.2d 897 (Minn. 1979); State v. Biron, 123
N.W.2d 392 (Minn. 1963).
88. Biron, 123 N.W.2d at 398-99; see MuN. STAT. § 634.03 (1992) ("A con-
fession of the defendant... [cannot] be given in evidence against him whether
made in the course of judicial proceedings or to a private person, when made
under the influence of fear produced by threats.").
89. State v. Willadson, 268 N.W.2d 546, 547 (Minn. 1978) (per curiam). As
a preliminary matter, the prosecution must demonstrate that Miranda warn-
ings were given, and that police obtained a valid waiver. i Absent other evi-
dence indicating the lack of a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver, the
confession is deemed valid. Id. In Willadson, the Minnesota Supreme Court
reversed the trial court's "presumption" that because the defendant made the
statements moments after the officer violently subdued him, his condition pre-
vented him from intelligently waiving his rights. Id-
90. State v. Murphy, 380 N.W.2d 766, 770 (Minn. 1986) (citing State v.
Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 727 (Minn. 1985)).
91. See State v. Hazley, 428 N.W.2d 406, 410 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984)).
92. See Bielejeski v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 351 N.W.2d 664, 667
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (citing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984)).
93. The Minnesota Supreme Court has observed, "the states 'are indepen-
dently responsible for safeguarding the rights of their citizens."' O'Connor v.
Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979) (quoting People v. Brisendine, 531
P.2d 1099, 1114 (Cal. 1975)). The court subsequently expanded on this
principle:
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Constitution as independent and adequate grounds for deter-
mining the admissibility of statements made during custodial
interrogation. The Minnesota Supreme Court made its first
tentative move in that direction in State v. Robinson.94 In
Robinson, the court noted that police frequently record the "ac-
tual interrogation," 95 and reasoned that recording the entire
"pre-statement" questioning would protect both the suspect and
the police and would obviate disputes arising from an accused's
claim that she was denied her constitutional rights during
questioning.9
Several years later, in State v. Pilcher,97 the Minnesota
Supreme Court expressed frustration at police interrogators'
failure to follow its recommendation in Robinson.8 In Pilcher,
the court ultimately accepted police officers' testimony that the
defendant waived his rights after receiving Miranda warnings
several different times,9 although it had no objective record of
While a decision of the United States Supreme Court interpreting an
identical provision of the federal constitution may be persuasive, it
should not be automatically followed or our separate constitution will
be of little value.... [W]e must remain independently responsible for
safeguarding the rights of our own citizens and for insuring that the
intent of the people of Minnesota in adopting our constitution is con-
tinued forward.
State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Minn. 1988); see also State v. Fuller, 374
N.W.2d 722, 726 (Minn. 1985) ("State courts are, and should be, the first line of
defense for individual liberties within the federalist system."), quoted in State
v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. 1987).
94. 427 N.W.2d 217 (Minn. 1988).
95. Id at 224 n.5. By "actual interrogation," the court apparently meant
those final questions posed by police that yield inculpatory statements. The
court did not deny that many long hours of questioning may take place prior
to this "actual interrogation."
96. Id. The court concluded,
[I]n the interest of assuring that the accused's rights have been ob-
served as well as validating the integrity of the actual interrogation,
recordation of all pre-statement conversations would afford the re-
viewing court an objective record... [not] one based upon self-serving
or subjective assertions of the principals involved.
1d,
97. 472 N.W.2d 327 (Minn. 1991).
98. Id. at 333.
99. Id. at 332-33. Police arrested Pilcher on probable cause to believe he
committed sexual assault and murder. Id. at 331-32. The first time the police
read Pilcher the Miranda warnings he "equivocally" invoked his right to coun-
sel by asking police, "Do you think I should have an attorney?" Id. at 331.
The officer replied that Pilcher could have an attorney if he wanted one. Id.
At the station Pilcher began talking to police. Id. One of the officers read
Pilcher his rights a second time and reminded him that he did not have to
speak; Pilcher then volunteered some incriminating statements. Id. Later,
during interrogation by a Bureau of Criminal Apprehension agent who carried
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the interrogation prior to Pilcher's taped confession. At the.
same time, the court expressed deep concern because police of-
ficers failed to record their initial conversations with the sus-
pect,10 and issued a clear warning. "In the future, we urge
that law enforcement professionals use those technological
means at their disposal to fully preserve those conversations
and events preceding actual interrogation. Law enforcement
personnel and prosecutors may expect that this court will look
with great disfavor upon any further refusal to heed these ad-
monitions."''1 The Minnesota Supreme Court has yet to take
the logical next step and require law enforcement officers to
record both Miranda waivers and the entire custodial interro-
gation as a matter of state due process. In contrast, the State of
Alaska requires, 02 and various model statutes and authorities
recommend, 10 3 full recordings of custodial interrogations.
a tape recorder, Pilcher responded to a re-reading of the Miranda warnings by
stating that he thought he should have a lawyer. Id. The agent testified that
he twice rose to leave, but Pilcher asserted that he wanted to "tell his side of
the story." Id. Only then did the agent turn on the tape recorder and record
Pilcher's statements. I&
100. Id at 332-33. "Nevertheless, we are troubled by conduct and judgment
exercised by these law enforcement professionals.... The present case pro-
vides a stellar example of a dispute that could have been avoided had the law
enforcement officers followed our recommendation in Robinson." I&
101. Id at 333 (emphasis added).
102. In Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985), the Supreme Court
of Alaska held as a matter of state constitutional law that "an unexcused fail-
ure to electronically record a custodial interrogation conducted in a place of
detention violates a suspect's [state] right to due process." Id. at 1158. A gen-
eral exclusionary rule excludes from evidence any statements taken in viola-
tion of the recording requirement. IH at 1164. The court reasoned that a
record of interrogation is reasonable and necessary to protect a suspect's right
to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, and due process guarantee of a
fair trial. Id. at 1159-60. According to the Alaska court, in addition to safe-
guarding those individual rights, the rule protects judicial integrity by allowing
courts to review an objective record rather than the testimony of interested
parties only. Id. at 1164.
The Alaska Supreme Court expressly based its decision entirely on its
state constitution to avoid unwarranted federal review. Id. at 1160; see Michi-
gan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) (announcing rule that the Supreme
Court will presume reliance on federal law unless a state court makes a clear
statement that a decision rests on independent and adequate state grounds).
103. See MODEL CODE OF PEE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 130.4 (1975) (re-
quiring that law enforcement officers make full sound recordings of all custo-
dial interrogations). The American Law Institute, author of the Model Code,
reports:
It is obvious that reliance upon oral testimony of the officer to estab-
lish the conditions of interrogation will often lead to a swearing con-
test between the police officer and the suspect, a contest which the
suspect will rarely win, whether he is telling the truth or not. It
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C. DETERMINING MINNESOTA CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
Both courts'0 and commentators' 0 5 urge thoughtful analy-
sis before a state court raises state constitutional standards
above those set by the United States Supreme Court under the
Federal Constitution. The state court should provide a rea-
soned explanation for finding the federal interpretation unper-
suasive or insufficient, giving the necessary weight to federal
precedent and the constitutional rights at issue.:L6 The stan-
dards state courts develop should also guide their citizens and
government agents.10 7
As in other states, the Minnesota Supreme Court has ar-
ticulated certain factors on which it bases a decision to inter-
pret a state constitutional provision differently than a parallel
federal provision. First, the court looks at whether textual sim-
ilarities between the state and federal provisions reflect the
framers' intention for similar interpretation.10 8 Second, the
court looks at Minnesota's constitutional history for an appro-
priate interpretation of a Minnesota constitutional provision.10 9
should be noted that criticism of this system does not stem exclusively
from fear of police abuse; the system is a demeaning one for the of-
ficer who is telling the truth as well, for in any case of conflicting tes-
timony, the credibility of that officer will be called into question, even
though his version may eventually be accepted. Sound recordings
would relieve the officer of this pressure. In addition, in some cases it
is possible that conflicts in the testimony concerning the interrogation
period result not from lying on anyone's part, but rather from differ-
ent recollections or interpretations of the events which transpired.
Sound recordings would allow the court to make its own independent
interpretation, based on an accurate picture of what really happened.
Id. commentary at 346; see also UNiF. R. CRIM. P. Rule 243 (1987) ("The infor-
mation of rights, any waiver thereof, and any questioning shall be recorded
whenever feasible and in any case where questioning occurs at a place of
detention.").
104. See, e.g., State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726-27 (Minn. 1985); O'Connor
v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979).
105. See Abrahamson, supra note 81, at 1176 (arguing that the state court
should always explain why the Supreme Court's reasoning is unpersuasive);
Fleming & Nordby, supra note 81, at 63 (criticizing result-oriented state
decisions).
106. Abrahamson, supra note 81, at 1176; William J. Brennan, Jr., State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489,
502 (1977).
107. Fleming & Nordby, supra note 81, at 63-66.
108. See Fuller, 374 N.W.2d at 727 (stating that where a state constitutional
provision is textually identical to a federal provision, the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal provision carries "inherently
persuasive, although not necessarily compelling, force").
109. See State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 382-83 (Minn. 1988) (explaining
how state constitutional history supports holding that the state constitutional
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Third, the court determines whether existing state law helps to
define the scope of the state constitutional provision. 10
Fourth, the court considers whether matters of particular state
or local concern justify an independent interpretation."' Fi-
nally, experimentation and a search for a "better rule of law,"
while susceptible to criticism if used as the sole basis for in-
dependent interpretation, may properly be considered as a
ground for independent interpretation."12
IV. MINNESOTA LAW REQUIRES OFFICERS TO
RECORD CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
Applying the aforementioned criteria, the Minnesota
Supreme Court should interpret article 1, section 7 of the Min-
nesota State Constitution, the state's due process clause, to re-
quire police officers to make and preserve an electronic record
of the entire custodial interrogation. The electronic recording
must contain no unexplained interruptions and must include
the communication of rights, waivers, and all subsequent ques-
tions and answers.
A. STATE DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
When defining its citizens' state constitutional rights, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota compares the text of parallel
state and federal provisions."13 In so doing, the court attempts
to fulfill the original intent of the state constitution's framers
and to achieve consistent decision-making. 114 Although not a
controlling presumption, by enacting a state constitutional pro-
provision granting the right to trial by jury implicitly confers the right to a 12-
member jury).
110. See State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901, 904-05 (Minn. 1983) (citing
state constitutional right-to-counsel precedent and state rules of criminal pro-
cedure to support holding that an uncounseled conviction on a guilty plea can
only be used to enhance a subsequent sentence when the defendant validly
waived her right to counsel on the record).
111. See State v. Murphy, 380 N.W.2d 766, 771 (Minn. 1986) (considering
whether the "unique relationship between probationer and probation officer as
seen in the light of the philosophy of the Minnesota criminal justice system"
requires adoption of position on the privilege against self-incrimination con-
trary to the federal view).
112. See Fleming & Nordby, supra note 81, at 76.
113. See State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 727 (Minn. 1985).
114. One commentator describes this principle-that federal interpretation
governs where state and federal constitutional provisions share identical lan-
guage-as an "artificial canon of construction." David R. Keyser, State Consti-
tutions and Theories of Judicial Review: Some Variations on a Theme, 63
TEx. L. REv. 1051, 1063 (1985).
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vision textually identical to a parallel federal provision, the
framers may have signaled their intention that the two provi-
sions receive identical interpretation.115 Even where the state
and federal provisions have identical language, however, the
state court need not accept a United States Supreme Court in-
terpretation of the federal provision as a binding interpretation
of the state constitutional provision.
116
The argument that federal interpretation of a federal con-
stitutional provision should govern state interpretation of a par-
allel state constitutional provision loses force where the
framers of the state constitution used different language.
Drafters of state constitutions, likely aware of a natural procliv-
ity to interpret textually identical provisions identically, 117
could provide greater protection to their citizens by selecting
different language than that contained in the Federal Constitu-
tion. Accordingly, where a state constitutional provision em-
ploys more expansive language than does its parallel federal
counterpart, the state courts should find that its drafters in-
tended that the state provision provide greater protection of in-
dividual rights than does its federal counterpart.
The drafters of the Minnesota Constitution envisioned that
state due process would embody a more expansive set of rights
than federal due process. The Minnesota Due Process Clause
provides: "No person shall be held to answer for a criminal of-
115. This presumption applies equally where the state constitutional provi-
sion originated in a constitution from another jurisdiction. Ewers v. Thunder-
bird Aviation, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 94, 99 n.6 (Minn. 1979) ("[W]here a
constitutional or statutory provision is taken from a neighboring state ... the
construction placed upon it by the court of that state is presumed to be
adopted with the provision.").
116. See, e.g., State v. Murphy, 380 N.W.2d 766, 773 (Minn. 1986) (Wahl, J.,
dissenting) ("[We are not obliged to adopt the United States Supreme Court's
construction of a federal constitutional provision in interpreting our own con-
stitution even if the language of a state constitutional privilege is identical.")
(citation omitted); Fleming & Nordby, supra note 81, at 68 ("Identical meaning
should not be implied merely because there is identical language."); Brennan,
supra note 106, at 500 ("[E]xamples abound where state courts have indepen-
dently considered the merits of constitutional arguments and declined to fol-
low opinions of the United States Supreme Court they find unconvincing, even
where the state and federal constitutions are similarly or identically
phrased.").
117. According to Professor Keyser, the canon of interpretation that identi-
cally worded texts will be treated as in pari materia "signal[s] to framers of
future state constitutions that, if they wish to broaden rights under the state
constitution beyond those guaranteed by the federal constitution, they must
make that purpose clear within the text itself." Keyser, supra note 114, at
1064.
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fense without due process of law, ... nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law."""' The Fed-
eral Due Process Clause, in contrast, specifies simply that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law." 9 Unless superfluous, the additional language
in Minnesota's due process clause explicitly guarantees more
pre-trial protection than does the Federal Due Process Clause.
The textual language of article I, section 7 of the Minnesota
Constitution, therefore, provides strong support for a more ex-
pansive interpretation of pre-trial rights than under federal due
process. 20 Given the express textual mandate in the state con-
stitution, the Minnesota Supreme Court should hold that state
due process requires law enforcement officers to record elec-
tronically custodial interrogations.
B. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
Minnesota has a unique constitutional history. Democratic
and Republican delegates, refusing to meet together, held sepa-
rate constitutional conventions.' 2 ' Each party published its
own record of the debates. 22 In 1857, with minimal debate,
118. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7.
119. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
120. Alaska, where state due process requires police to electronically rec-
ord custodial interrogations, see supra note 102 and accompanying text, also
has a state due process provision that affords its state citizens heightened pre-
trial protection. The Alaska Constitution provides: "No person shall be de-
prived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. The right of all
persons to fair and just treatment in the course of legislative and executive in-
vestigations shall not be infringed." ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 7. That the
Alaska provision explicitly mentions executive investigations, whereas the
Minnesota provision requires due process before a person is held to answer for
a criminal offense, does not warrant dissimilar results. Both constitutions pro-
vide pre-trial protections beyond what the Federal Constitution provides.
Several states have declined to interpret their state constitutions in ac-
cordance with the rule of Stephan. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 522 So.2d 201,
208 (Miss. 1988); Jimenez v. State, 755 P.2d 694, 696-97 (Nev. 1989); State v.
Gorton, 548 A.2d 419, 421-22 (Vt. 1988); State v. Spurgeon, 820 P.2d 960, 961-62
(Wash. Ct. App. 1991). Those states' constitutional due process provisions,
however, do not use language more expansive than the Federal Due Process
Clause. See MISS. CONST. art. III, § 14; NEv. CONST. art. I, § 8; VT. CONST. ch. I,
art. 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3.
121. For a fascinating, detailed report of the Minnesota state constitutional
conventions, see WILLIAM ANDERSON & ALBERT J. LOBB, A HISTORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF MINNESOTA (1921). The two separate conventions met daily
and debated, usually at the same hours, at opposite ends of the old capitol. Id
at 86.
122. The drafters printed transcripts of both the Democratic and Republi-
can debates. THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE MINNESOTA CONSTITU-
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both parties ratified a compromise constitution drafted by a
joint committee. The debates from the separate constitutional
conventions inform the modern reader about the concerns of
the framers, and they furnish a significant resource for the
court, particularly for interpreting the Minnesota bill of
rights. 23 Minnesota's constitutional history reveals that dele-
gates recognized that the protections in the bill of rights are
fundamental2 4 and expressly wanted the state constitution to
be interpreted independently of the Federal Constitution.125
Because they do not reflect the proceedings of the compro-
mise committee that ultimately drafted the state constitution,
however, the debates do relatively little to clarify the meaning
of individual provisions. Furthermore, the constitutional de-
bates shed limited light on the meaning of article I, section 7
because the state significantly amended this provision in
1904.126 As originally ratified in 1857, article I, section 7 of the
Minnesota Constitution read: "No person shall be held to an-
swer for a criminal offence unless on the presentment or indict-
ment of a Grand Jury . .. nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
TIONAL CONVENTION (Francis H. Smith ed., 1857) [hereinafter DEMOCRATIC
CONVENTION]; DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TION FOR THE TERRITORY OF MINNESOTA (T.F. Andrews ed., 1858) [hereinafter
REPUBLICAN CONvENTION].
123. Fleming & Nordby, supra note 81, at 70. Perhaps more than any
other article of the Minnesota Constitution, the bill of rights shows the fusion
of Democratic and Republican materials. See ANDERSON & LOBB, supra note
121, at 117-18. Neither party can claim primary responsibility for the provi-
sions. The general order of the provisions closely follows the Republican
party's proposal, which drew heavily on the Wisconsin Constitution of 1848.
I& at 117. Thus, decisions construing the Wisconsin Constitution may also as-
sist the Minnesota Supreme Court in interpreting the Minnesota Constitution.
"This is significant because '[t]he Wisconsin Supreme Court has traditionally
adhered to the notion that the state constitution reflects an individual commit-
ment to the value of personal liberty, a commitment not constrained by the
vicissitudes of contemporaneous federal doctrine."' Fleming & Nordby, supra
note 81, at 70 n.81 (quoting Introduction: An Examination of the Wisconsin
Constitution, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 483, 483 (1979)).
124. See, e.g., REPUBLICAN CONVENTION, supra note 122, at 101 (statement
of Del. Perkins) ("The object [of the bill of rights], as I understand it, is to set
forth to the world those fundamental ideas and principles which underlie our
Constitution.").
125. The debates support the conclusion that drafters intended the Minne-
sota courts to protect strictly certain individual rights regardless of any dimi-
nution of those rights at the federal level. "While I would pay due regard to
all other Constitutions, I am not willing to bind myself to follow their example
in all respects. I am not afraid of adopting some new ideas, if they seem rea-
sonable and proper. I believe we may well make some improvements." Id at
97 (statement of Del. Colburn).
126. 1905 MlNN. LAWS 4.
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property, without due process of law." In 1868, the legisla-
ture proposed an amendment to the due process clause that
would have discontinued the grand jury requirement without
affording any significant pre-trial protections in its place.'m
That amendment failed in a popular election. Dissatisfied with
the grand jury requirement, yet concerned about its citizens'
pre-trial rights, the state amended the due process clause in
1904, the language still in effect today. Thus, Minnesota's citi-
zens ultimately adopted a rule of due process offering greater
pre-trial rights to an accused than its federal counterpart.
C. STATE PRECEDENT
The Minnesota Supreme Court also looks at state law to
define the scope of state constitutional protections.12 9 Decisions
construing the Minnesota bill of rights furnish a vital source of
authority for independent interpretation. Early cases imple-
menting article I give the court particular assistance with state
constitutional interpretation. 130 For example, as part of its
commitment to "zealously guard" the state privilege against
self-incrimination, 131 the Minnesota Supreme Court developed
state law that is independent of federal constitutional interpre-
127. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7 (amended 1904).
128. 1868 MINN. GEN. LAWS ch. CVII. According to the proposed amend-
ment, article I, § 7 would have read: "No person for the same offense shall be
put twice in jeopardy of punishment, nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law." Id
129. See State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901, 904-05 (Minn. 1983). In Nord-
strom, the court relied on the long-standing state constitutional rule that a de-
fendant has the right to counsel in any case in which a finding of guilt could
result in incarceration and the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure as au-
thority to hold that uncounseled misdemeanor convictions cannot be used to
enhance a sentence for a subsequent offense unless the record reflects a valid
waiver of counsel. Id at 905.
130. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 15 N.W.2d 554, 560 (Minn. 1944) (stating that
"fundamental rights," such as the presumption of innocence and proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, although not expressly enumerated in the state constitu-
tion, "are as much a part of the constitution as though expressly set out");
Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley, 14 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1944) (declaring
that the right to acquire and enjoy property and the right to establish a home
and family relations, though not enumerated, are "fundamental maxims" pro-
tected by article I, § 8 of the state constitution); Fleming & Nordby, supra note
81, at 72 (reporting that early state constitutional decisions interpreted the
Minnesota Bill of Rights in a surprisingly expansive manner).
131. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7 ("No person shall be ... compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself .... "); State v. Rixon, 231 N.W.
217, 218 (Minn. 1930).
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tation on waiving that privilege.1 32 Federal law presumes a
lack of compulsion to speak,l 3s whereas early Minnesota prece-
dent required the state to show affirmatively that the defend-
ant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived her
privilege against self-incrimination13 4
The more recent cases, however, shed less light on the
scope of state constitutional rights because of the court's ten-
dency to base its decisions on both federal and state constitu-
tional guarantees rather than to rely exclusively on the state
constitution. Although the Minnesota Supreme Court has
lately relied less on independent state constitutional grounds to
determine the rights of criminal defendants, the court should
follow its earlier precedent and back up its continued rhetoric
in favor of independent state constitutional interpretation.
D. PARTICULAR STATE CONCERNS
A state is often in a better position than the United States
Supreme Court to determine matters of importance to its citi-
zens. Matters of criminal procedure easily fall into this cate-
gory for several reasons. The vast majority of criminal
prosecutions occur at the state level.1 35 Thus, state courts are
the focus of pressure for interpretation and expansion of the
rights of criminal defendants. 3 6 State courts may also feel
132. See State v. Iosue, 19 N.W.2d 735, 741 (Minn. 1945) (holding that
waiver of privilege against self-incrimination by a witness testifying before the
grand jury must be made in "a frame of mind wholly 'free from any sense of
compulsion.' "); State v. Gardiner, 92 N.W. 529, 533 (Minn. 1902) (explaining
that state privilege prohibits compelling of both direct testimony and circum-
stantial evidence); State v. Froiseth, 16 Minn. 296, 298 (1871) (holding that
state constitution protects grand jury witnesses from self-incrimination 20
years before the Supreme Court reached the same conclusion under the Fed-
eral Constitution in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892)); see also
State v. Berry, 214 N.W.2d 232, 234 (Minn. 1974) (allowing privilege to be
waived orally, in writing, or by conduct); State v. Falcone, 195 N.W.2d 572, 577
(Minn. 1972) (prohibiting prosecutor from using devious means to obtain a
waiver from a grand jury witness).
133. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429 (1984) (considering defend-
ant's response voluntary because "he was free to claim the privilege");
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) ("Our cases do not reflect
an uncritical demand for a knowing and intelligent waiver in every situation
where a person has failed to invoke a constitutional protection.").
134. See supra note 132.
135. "The state courts handle the vast bulk of all criminal litigation in this
country. In 1982, more than 12 million criminal actions (excluding juvenile
and traffic charges) were filed in the 50 state court systems and the District of
Columbia." Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1043 n.8 (1983) (citation omitted).
136. See Fleming & Nordby, supra note 81, at 74.
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more justified in making independent decisions about matters
of procedure than about more complex matters of substantive
law.137 Finally, the desire for national uniformity, which gen-
erally inhibits independent state decisions, more easily gives
way to a state court's recognition that particular state concerns
should independently govern the standards of essential fairness
in state criminal procedure.1as
These minimum standards may not adequately address
concerns of abuse in Minnesota state courts. The methods local
and state police use to interrogate criminal suspects, and the
treatment state courts accord to the resultant confessions, have
a direct impact on the integrity of the state judiciary. The cred-
ibility of the state judiciary depends on a fair determination of
the voluntariness question, but the lack of a complete, objective
record of custodial interrogation under our current system im-
pedes that determination.
In addition to judicial integrity, Minnesota has a distinct in-
terest in its state courts' efficiency. An objective record of po-
lice interrogation would avoid frivolous claims of police
misconduct during questioning. Under the current system, liti-
gation results every time a defendant claims that she did not
understand or voluntarily waive her rights, or when she alleges
police coercion during interrogation.
E. A BETTER RULE
To fully protect individual rights, the Minnesota Supreme
Court should consider what the better rule of law is when it in-
terprets its state constitution.139 Justice Powell aptly articu-
lated the concept:
[O]ne of the more obvious merits of our federal system is the opportu-
nity it affords each State, if its people so choose, to become a "labora-
tory" and to experiment with a range of trial and procedural
alternatives. Although the need for the innovations that grow out of
diversity has always been great, imagination unimpeded by unwar-
ranted demands for national uniformity is of special importance at a
time when serious doubt exists as to the adequacy of our criminal jus-
137. Id
138. Id at 74-75.
139. The court explicitly recognizes this approach in a procedural choice-
of-law context. Under the better rule of law methodology, Minnesota recog-
nizes its interest in ensuring that non-residents who litigate state claims in
Minnesota have their disputes resolved according to rules and procedures con-
sistent with Minnesota's concept of justice. See Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289
N.W.2d 43, 49 (Minn. 1978), qffl'd, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Milkovich v. Saari, 203
N.W.2d 408, 416-17 (Minn. 1973).
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tice system.
1 40
Although Justice Powell issued this statement to support
diverse state legislative innovations to improve state criminal
procedure, the argument applies with equal force to innovative
state constitutional interpretations.
State due process is a fluid, evolving concept that has yet to
catch up with the evolution of police interrogation. Histori-
cally, police commonly extracted incriminating information
from criminal suspects through physical torture. Today, police
interrogators rely on more subtle tactics of psychological coer-
cion and manipulation. The courts must monitor interrogation
practices to guarantee that the government treats criminal sus-
pects fairly. The courts cannot fulfill this obligation, however,
without a complete, accurate, and objective record. Fairness
and justice demand a record of custodial interrogation. In no
other area of our criminal justice system does the constitution
permit state agents so much freedom to confront an accused
criminal.
The need to enable courts to review the interrogation pro-
cess must be weighed against arguments opposing a recording
requirement. As a preliminary matter, the feasibility of the
rule is not in dispute in so far as police at the station house
have easy access to the necessary equipment.141 Opponents ar-
gue that privacy is essential to successful interrogation. Elec-
tronic recordation, however, eliminates secrecy, not privacy.
Police also claim that recording interrogations has a negative
impact on suspects' behavior, but available data from studies
conducted in Britain'4 2 largely dispel concerns that tape record-
ing inhibits suspects from talking 4 3 or that suspects falsify
abuses for the record. Experiments with recorded interroga-
tions revealed that while recordings had only a limited impact
140. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 376 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring)
(holding that a state statute permitting less-than-unanimous jury verdicts for
criminal conviction does not violate federal due process).
141. See generally Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Paratexts, 44
STAN. L. REV. 509, 510-14, 543-44 (1992) (discussing the increasing availability
of electronic media and the feasibility of videotaping confessions).
142. See Michael McConville & Philip Morrell, Recording the Interroga-
tion: Have the Police Got It Taped?, 1983 CRIM. L. REV. 158, 159-60.
143. Id. The recording rule announced by the Alaska Supreme Court per-
mits an excused failure to record custodial interrogation. See Stephan v. State,
711 P.2d 1156, 1162 (Alaska 1985). If a suspect refused to speak on tape, police
interrogators would be excused from the recording requirement. Id In that
case, however, the state would have the burden of persuading the court that
recording was not feasible, and the failure to record should be viewed with dis-
trust. HdL at 1162-63.
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on suspects' behavior, they substantially affected police con-
duct.1 " Finally, opponents may argue that lay jurors and even
judges may misunderstand or misuse the information in re-
corded interrogations because of their inability to appreciate
how the dangers, pressures, and demands of police work affect
law enforcement officers' treatment of criminal suspects during
interrogation. American juries have, however, shown a willing-
ness to accept the difficulties of police work as a justification
for behavior that would seem brutal in almost any other
context.145
Recognition that state due process mandates recordation of
custodial interrogation would serve as an important first step in
fashioning better confession jurisprudence. At last, the public
could begin to understand interrogation and the role that the
procedure plays in our accusatorial system. With that knowl-
edge, the legislature could develop well-considered regulation
of interrogation practices.
CONCLUSION
Due process under article I, section 7 of the Minnesota
Constitution requires law enforcement officers to make a com-
plete electronic record of custodial interrogation. Any unex-
cused failure by police to make such a record should render the
confession inadmissible for any purpose. The text of the state
due process provision, state constitutional history, early state
precedents, and the highly localized nature of state criminal
procedure all support this independent interpretation of state
due process. Equally significant, the due process recordation
requirement offers the state a better rule of law to govern po-
lice interrogation and the admissibility of confessions.
A complete, objective record of what happens in the inter-
rogation room would provide the courts with a fair basis for re-
view of confessions. Defendants would be afforded more
protection from physical and psychological abuse. At the same
time, the state would be spared the time and expense of litigat-
ing frivolous claims of police misconduct. Finally, recording
144. McConville & Morrell, supra note 142, at 161 ("[No doubt... the in-
troduction of tape-recording, even on an experimental basis, quickly produced
marked changes in the numbers, duration and content of police
interrogations.").
145. See, e.g., Richard A. Serrano & Tracy Wilkinson, All 4 in King Beating
Acquitted, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al (reporting jury's acquittal of four
white officers, accused of using unnecessary force during the arrest of a black
man, after finding the officers' actions proper under the circumstances).
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custodial interrogation would alert the general public to police
tactics of psychological coercion. Thus, the recording require-
ment would mark a step toward better state confessions juris-
prudence: Armed with an awareness of the reality of police
interrogation, the people of Minnesota could decide how these
procedures fit with our evolving concept of criminal justice.
